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Abstract. This paper identifies and analyses some drawbacks of the logistic map
which is still one of the most used chaotic maps in image encryption algorithms. As
some of the disadvantages are caused by inappropriate implementations of the logis-
tic map, this paper proposes a set of rules which should lead to enhancement of the
desired chaotic behavior. Probably the most important rule introduces alternating
value of parameter utilized by the logistic map. With careful choice of values and an
adapted quantization technique, some of the issues should be fixed and theoretically
also the values of numerical parameters should be improved. These assumptions are
verified by applying the proposed set of rules on an algorithm from our prior work.
Effects of the proposed rules on the used algorithm are investigated and all nec-
essary modifications are thoroughly discussed. The paper also compares obtained
values of commonly used numerical parameters and computational complexity with
some other image encryption algorithms based on more complex chaotic systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, there are many possible ways for establishing security of multimedia
data. Each solution has certain advantages and drawbacks determined by its design
and expected applications. This statement is valid even for well-established “con-
ventional” encryption algorithms such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [1].
While AES could be used in a wide amount of applications, it was designed primar-
ily for operations with small blocks of hexadecimal data. Careless implementation
of AES for image encryption, especially using simpler modes of operation could lead
to undesired results. One example of this situation is shown in Figure 1 where
a grayscale image with a resolution of 256 × 128 pixels was encrypted by AES us-
ing Electronic CodeBook (ECB) mode of operation [2]. This example used key
0× C4 EB 50 BC 0E C5 EB 50 BC 0E C5 EB 50 BC 0E C5 for the encryption.
image encrypted by AES ECBplain image (before encryption)
Figure 1. Visible artifacts in an image encrypted by AES ECB
The encrypted image displayed in Figure 1 shows that AES in ECB mode could
create visible artifacts that are correlated with the plain image. This drawback is
not present in other modes of operation [2], but not all users are familiar with it.
Presented issue of AES in ECB mode is caused by its design – the image is
processed as a set of blocks. Each block is replaced by a corresponding block from
a code book during the encryption. If the plain image contains several identical
blocks of image pixel intensities, all these blocks are replaced by the same block
from the code book. This situation is undesirable since the images are known for
rather high redundancy and they can contain multiple groups of identical blocks.
On the other hand, encryption algorithms that were designed specifically for
image encryption try to adjust their steps to characteristics of image data. This
means that the dedicated image encryption algorithms are robust against attacks
that are feasible on image data. Also, performance of the dedicated algorithms
should be better, however this is hard to prove as the conventional algorithms use
various tricks such as hardware acceleration [3] for increasing their performance.
The dedicated image encryption algorithms found their applications mainly in
areas which are sensitive to presence of even small artifacts such as encryption
of medical images [4] or encryption of secret data in steganographic systems [5].
Also some biometric systems could benefit from lower computational complexity of
carefully designed image encryption algorithms [6].
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The history of dedicated image encryption algorithms goes back to 1989, when
Matthews proposed an encryption algorithm that utilized logistic map (LM) [7].
While this scheme did not encrypt images, it described some techniques that later
became essential for the image encryption algorithms. The choice of used chaotic
map was explained by Matthews mainly by good understanding of the LM at the
time. One of the first extensive studies of LM was published already in 1976 by
May [8] and since then, multiple works investigated properties of LM in general [9,
10, 11], or its properties in certain applications [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17].
The work of Matthews was later continued by Fridrich, who described one of
the first encryption algorithms designed specifically for operations with images in
1998 [18]. Probably the biggest advantage of Fridrich’s algorithm is its architecture
which was later adopted by many other image encryption algorithms. Some of
the drawbacks of this algorithm and similar ones were described by Solak et al.
in 2010 [19] and later also by Xie et al. in 2017 [20]. The newest image encryption
algorithms take into account the drawbacks of Fridrich’s architecture and they utilize
techniques to overcome these issues [21, 22, 23, 24]. However, less work has been
done in mitigating vulnerabilities of the LM in image encryption algorithms even if
they are already described [12, 14].
These vulnerabilities such as occurrence of periodic cycles [10], existence of a re-
lation between successive iterates or their uneven distribution [12] negatively affect
generated pseudo-random (PR) sequences. If the generated sequences do not possess
required statistical properties and they are still used for encryption, the analysis of
encrypted data can reveal information about algorithm’s architecture or a part of
used key. Furthermore, some attacks can obtain parts of the plain data and this
could eventually lead to a break of whole encryption algorithm [13, 14, 15, 16].
The LM is not the only chaotic map used for image encryption, however it
can be considered as one of the most popular. Some approaches utilize various
modifications of LM or other chaotic maps. Cao et al. described a new custom map
in their paper from 2018 [25] that was a result of cascading LM and other chaotic
map. Similar solution was proposed by Alawida et al. in 2019 [26]. In both these
cases authors review basic properties of the resulting maps by means of their chaotic
behavior. However, long-time experience with LM shows that new vulnerabilities
could be found out even after multiple years of research [14]. Therefore usage of
a newly derived chaotic map without exhaustive analysis of its properties could be
viewed as a disadvantage of whole image encryption algorithm.
Other notable approach for enhancement of chaotic behavior is usage of chaotic
maps with far too many dimensions. Usage of multidimensional systems could lead
to big key spaces, however in general they have a negative impact on computational
complexity of the algorithms. Probably the most extreme cases are algorithms by
Zhu and Zhu from 2018 [27] or by Sun et al. from 2019 [28]. The first proposal uses
six dimensional system, while the second one uses seven dimensional system.
In this paper, we would like to address some of the basic defects regarding usage
of LM in the image encryption algorithms. While some are caused by the map itself
(or its discretized version), some can be viewed as an inappropriate implementation
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by the researchers. We would like to propose some fixes for issues that still do
not have an efficient solution. As these fixes can affect other techniques used in
the field (such as quantization [29]), this paper will briefly describe also some well-
known practices in the field of image encryption. Furthermore, in order to provide
a complex insight to all necessary blocks of an image encryption algorithm, we will
shortly mention also some techniques described in our prior works (e.g. in [24]).
The second goal of this paper is to compare values of commonly used numerical
parameters and measure the increase of computational complexity caused by the
proposed fixes. As equation of the LM is considered to be quite simple and therefore
the map is considered as relatively fast [10], the proposed fixes should not greatly
affect the computational complexity. The increase of computational complexity
would be measured by applying the proposed fixes to our prior algorithm [24].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes the behavior
and general properties of the LM. Section 3 describes proposed fixes and the way
how they interact with other used techniques. Also some other useful methods are
mentioned. Section 4 experimentally verifies impact of proposed fixes and contains
measurements of numerical parameters and computational complexity. Lastly, Sec-
tion 5 summarizes the paper and gives a brief overview of possible future work.
2 LOGISTIC MAP AND ITS PROPERTIES
Logistic map (LM) could be characterized as an one dimensional chaotic map with
one control parameter r. When r ∈ (0, 4), each iteration of LM produces an iterate
xn ∈ (0, 1). Calculation of the first iterate x1 requires an initial value x0 ∈ (0, 1)
(also known as an initial point). Equation for the LM can be expressed as (1):
xn+1 = r · xn(1− xn). (1)
Equation (1) shows that successive iterates xn+1 use values of previous iterates xn
in their calculations. In order to suppress noticeable relationship between initial
value x0 and successive iterates, some of them are used only for providing other
initial value. This concept is known as a transient period and its usual length is at
least 1 000 iterates. With this length, the first 1 000 iterates are discarded (they are
not used for an application of the LM) and the first usable iterate is x1001.
2.1 Bifurcations, Self Similarity and Islands of Stability
The behavior of LM with various values of parameter r can be illustrated by a bifur-
cation diagram. An example of a bifurcation diagram obtained with 1 000 samples
for r ∈ (0, 4) is shown in Figure 2.
First bifurcation takes place at r ∼ 3, where predictable trajectory of iterate
values divides into two trajectories. Iterate values switch between these trajectories,
called orbits based on value of parameter r. Second bifurcation happens at r =
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Figure 2. A bifurcation diagram of the logistic map
1 +
√
6 ∼ 3.44949. The distance between following bifurcations decreases each time
by a ratio approximately given by Feigenbaum constant δf ∼ 4.6692 [30].
It needs to be pointed out that the shape of orbits after second bifurcation
resembles shape of orbits after first bifurcation. This is one example of self similarity
or fractal behavior caused by the LM.
The point where r ∼ 3.56995 is considered as “an onset of chaos” [31]. However,
the iterates still do not obtain values from whole interval of (0, 1). Moreover, there
are some areas known as islands of stability where increasing value of r does not cause
multiplication of orbit amount, but the amount of orbits is significantly decreased.
The self similarity of LM and an island of stability around r = 1 +
√
8 ∼ 3.82843
are illustrated in Figure 3 on a magnified part of the bifurcation diagram. The
magnified part contains 1 000 samples for r ∈ (3.5, 4).
2.2 Measurement of Chaotic Behavior
Quantification of chaotic behavior is important for comparing various chaotic maps.
The dynamics of chaotic maps are usually expressed by values of maximal Lyapunov
exponents (LEs) λmax. As the LM is only one dimensional chaotic map, it does have
only one LE λmax = λ.
The basic idea behind computation of LEs investigates relationship of two or-
bits: the first one starts with an initial point p0 and initial point for the sec-
ond orbit denoted as p0 + δ0 is achieved by applying small perturbation δ0 to
the point p0. If orbits for these two initial points diverge from each other over
time (λ > 0), investigated system is considered as chaotic. Otherwise, when the
orbits are converging to each other (λ < 0), it may indicate that investigated
system at a certain point tends to have periodic orbit or a fixed point. These
two basic situations are displayed in Figure 4. Generally speaking, the higher
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Figure 3. An illustration of self similarity and islands of stability
value of positive λ is, the better chaotic behavior can be expected from chaotic
map.


































Figure 4. An illustration of diverging and converging orbits
In general, the values of λ can be computed via (2). Please note that practical
computations are limited to finite amount of iterates n. Therefore, the resulting











where brackets |a| denote absolute value of a, δ0 is an initial perturbation – an initial
difference between orbits, δn is the difference between orbits after n iterations, ln(b)
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is a natural logarithm of b, (fn) is a value of function f at point n, (fn)′(x0) is
a derivation of fn with respect to x0 and i is the iterate index number.
The calculations of λ for the LM substitute arbitrary function f with (1) that
could be rearranged and its derivation with respect to xi equals to r(1−2xi). There-









Please note that the value of λLM depends on both r and xi which is a substitu-
tion for xn from (1). While the dependence on r is pretty clear from the bifurcation
diagram (see Figure 2 as the amount of bifurcations increases with greater values
of r), the dependence on xn is not that clear. It is caused by the fact that xn is a
result of n iterations of the LM which started with an initial value of x0 ∈ (0, 1).
Various values of x0 therefore can affect the behavior of the LM [32].
The obtained estimated values of LE for the LM with x0 = 0.5, r ∈ 〈0, 4〉
and n = 1 000 are displayed in Figure 5. The interval for r is represented by 40 000
samples. The red line at λ = 0 marks the boundary which determines if the behavior
of the LM is considered as chaotic or not. Please note that the predictable regions
of the bifurcation diagram (see Figures 2 and 3) result in negative values of λ.
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Figure 5. Estimated Lyapunov exponents for r ∈ 〈0, 4〉
A detail of the estimated values of LE for x0 = 0.5, r ∈ 〈3.5, 4〉 and n = 1 000
is shown in Figure 6. The interval investigated in Figure 6 uses finer resolution as
it contains 50 000 samples (equivalent to 400 000 samples for r ∈ 〈0, 4〉). It needs to
be pointed out that the spike around island of stability at r = 1 +
√
8 ∼ 3.82843
resembles spikes visible in Figure 5. This is also caused by self similarity of the
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Figure 6. Estimated Lyapunov exponents for r ∈ 〈3.5, 4〉
LM [31]. Therefore usage of finer resolution could reveal some spikes that are present
at values of r that could be otherwise not sampled.
Please note that while the equation of the LM (1) is given for r ∈ (0, 4), the plot
of estimated LE in Figure 4 uses r ∈ 〈0, 4〉. This is due to fact that global minimum
and global maximum of the estimated LE values are located on the boundary points
of this interval. Some researchers use λmax ∼ 1.3447 which is present for x0 =
0.5 at r = 4 with n = 1 000, however this value of r could cause occurrence of
a fixed point xn = 0 in systems with finite precision (used in a majority of practical
applications).
With usage of the double precision data type defined by IEEE 754 standard [33],
the decimal part of number is represented by 52 bits. This gives a precision of
log10 2
52 ∼ 15.6536 decimal places, therefore double precision data type reliably
represents only numbers with 15 or less decimal places. If some number has more
decimal places, it is rounded to the closest double precision value.
The largest value of λ for x0 = 0.5, r ∈ (0, 4) and n = 1 000 in the double
precision data type is located at r = 4− 9 · 10−15 and its estimated value is approx.
0.67601. This measurement used resolution equivalent to 4 · 1016 samples for the
interval of r ∈ 〈0, 4〉, therefore the set of possible xn has more samples than the
amount of numbers in interval (0, 1) represented by the double precision data type.
The effect of various initial values x0 on estimated values of λ is illustrated
in Figure 7. This measurement used amount of samples equivalent to 4 · 1013 for
r ∈ 〈0, 4〉 and n = 1 000. Please note that the two used values of x0 cause different
behavior of the LM only around a “self similar window”. Also the values of λ were
estimated with relatively fine resolution, coarser resolutions with less samples could
suppress some areas with significant spikes.
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Figure 7. Dependence of estimated Lyapunov exponents on initial value x0
2.3 Periodic Cycles and Fixed Points
As it was already mentioned, negative values of λ could lead to inappropriate be-
havior of the LM. One example of this behavior can be demonstrated using the
local minimum of λ for x0 = 0.5 from Figure 7. Successive iterates generated with
parameter r belonging to this minimum of λ are shown in Table 1.
x0 = 0.5, r = 3.999962347607499
x1 = 0.999990586901875 x6 = 0.009607660983953 x10 = x1 = 0.999990586901875
x2 = 0.000037651683653 x7 = 0.038061057061643 x11 = x2 = 0.000037651683653
x3 = 0.000150599646393 x8 = 0.146448273443029 x12 = x3 = 0.000150599646393
x4 = 0.000602302194975 x9 = 0.500000000000973 x13 = x4 = 0.000602302194975
x5 = 0.002407735043706 x14 = x5 = 0.002407735043706
Table 1. An example of periodic cycles generated by logistic map
The situation presented in Table 1 is known as a periodic cycle of the LM.
The presented example is caused by finite precision as a value of iterate x9 is very
similar to the value of x0 and while their successive iterates are different in systems
with higher precision, double precision systems represent them both with the same
value that eventually becomes x10 = x1. Situations like this are undesirable in
cryptographic applications. In this case the length of this periodic cycle is just
9 iterates.
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Analytical solution for finding out periodic cycles and their length for arbitrary
values of r and x0 has not been proposed yet. Persohn and Povinelli provided
an overview of amount of periodic cycles with certain length, however, only for the
single precision data type [10]. Therefore, possible occurrence of periodic cycles in
the LM could be indicated only by negative values of λ.
Another issue with the LM is existence of fixed points for xn ∈ (0, 4). The fixed
points do not change their values in successive iterations which could be expressed
mathematically as xn = xn+1 = xn+2 = · · · = xn+m where m is amount of iterates
computed after xn. The fixed points for the LM could be obtained analytically by
setting xn+1 to xn in (1). The modified equation has two solutions: xn equals either
0 or 1− 1
r
. While the first case is easily suppressed by using xn ∈ (0, 4), the second
case is a bigger issue as value of this fixed point changes depending on used r. The
issue with this fixed point can be illustrated by an example provided in Table 2.
x0 = 0.25, r = 4− 10−15, fixed point at xn = 1− 1r ∼ 0.75
x1 = 0.75
x2 = x1 = 0.75
x3 = x2 = x1 = 0.75
Table 2. An illustration of a fixed point of logistic map
An interesting thing about the example presented in Table 2 is that the value of
1− 1
4−10−15 is considered to be equal to 1−
1
4
= 0.75. In this case the small difference
could not be preserved due to finite precision of double precision data type.
The issue with fixed points needs to be solved for enabling proper usage of the
LM for encryption. The probability of “hitting” a fixed point among all other iterate
values may seem low, but after reaching the value of the fixed point, all successive
iterates will have the same value.
2.4 Relation Between Successive Iterates, Their Distribution
and the Need for Quantization
As it is visible in (1), the LM is an iterative function as xn = f(xn−1). Equation (1)
could be rearranged and there are two solutions for calculating value of previous











The dependence of iterate values on values of the previous iterates could be also
illustrated by a Poincaré plot. An example of this plot is shown in Figure 8 where
a sequence of 2 000 iterates was computed with r = 4− 10−15 and x0 = 0.5.
Two dimensional Poincaré plots have values of actual iterate xn on their vertical
axis and values of previous iterates xn−1 on their horizontal axis. If a horizontal
line representing xn would be drawn over the plot, two perpendicular lines drawn at
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interceptions with the parabola lead to values of xn−1. Figure 8 shows the example
presented in Table 2, where iterate value xn = 0.75 could be obtained from two
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Figure 8. A Poincaré plot showing relation between two successive iterates
While this relation is crucial for computing successive iterates, it needs to be
suppressed for usage in cryptographic applications. The possibility of reconstructing
previous iterate values from one iterate is investigated by phase space reconstruction
attacks [34, 35], however none of the proposed attacks could be practically used yet.
Other important feature of a set of computed iterates is their distribution among
the interval (0, 1). Ideally, the distribution should be uniform. However, as it was
already mentioned and as it is visible in the bifurcation diagrams (see Figures 2
and 3), some values of r do not produce iterate values xn that cover whole interval
(0, 1). An illustration of this case is shown in Figure 9 where blue bins use r1 = 3.75,
x0 = 0.5 and transient period of 1 000 iterates in order to generate 10
6 iterates. The
second set of bins, red ones were generated by the same settings of the LM except
for using r2 = 4− 10−15. The histogram has 20 bins with equal size.
Figure 9 shows that the first non-zero bin for r1 = 3.75 is located in interval
(0.2, 0.25〉 and the last one is present in interval (0.9, 0.95〉. The four bins at the
beginning and the last bin are empty in the case of r1 while they are populated for
r2. Also, please note that the bins close to boundaries of the histogram have bigger
amount of samples and that the histogram for r2 is approximately symmetric with
respect to its center. These findings could be used for analysis, so they need to be
suppressed for enabling usage of the LM for image encryption.
There is also a problem with the usage of computed iterate values in image
encryption algorithms. As the iterate values xn are decimal numbers from interval
(0, 1) and the image encryption algorithms process images either as a set of bytes
(256 possible integer values) or bits (2 possible integer values), it is useful to perform
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Figure 9. Distribution of iterate values for two different values of parameter r
quantization of the iterate values. Multiple ways of quantization were proposed,
some of our prior work even solves the already mentioned issue of relation between
successive iterates [24].
3 PROPOSED SOLUTION
Based on the findings from analysis of the LM, we tried to mitigate its drawbacks
by using a following set of rules:
• usage of combinations of parameter r and initial value x0 that have positive λ,
so the occurrence of periodic cycles should be suppressed,
• the fixed points should be suppressed by alternating two values of r – each value
of r will have its counterpart, denoted as rc (from “complementary r”) which
would have a fixed point located at other value of xn,
• each pair of values of r and rc should be selected in a way that results in quick
divergence form their respective fixed points,
• the elements of resulting PR sequences should not have any distinctive relation
between pairs of successive elements and their distribution should be close to
uniform (this point has been partially solved in our prior works [24, 35]),
• implementation of these rules should have minimal impact on the computational
complexity of image encryption algorithms.
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3.1 Suitable Parameters for Logistic Map in Double Precision Data Type
In order to meet given requirements, we chose to use interval of parameter r that
obtains positive values of λ and does not have many significant spikes. As most
image encryption algorithms use double precision data type, the upper boundary of
chosen interval was set the closest it can get to r = 4, so the upper boundary was
chosen as 4− 10−15.
The selection of a lower boundary was motivated by enabling as large interval
of parameter r as possible. The size of this interval is important, as key elements
are used directly for computation of values of r. Therefore, the larger interval of r
enables larger amount of usable keys (known as a key space).
The keys are represented in a hexadecimal or binary form. Conversion between
these two forms is simple as one hexadecimal character contains 16 = 24 binary
characters. For enabling usage of integer amount of key elements as values of r,
also the number of samples in interval of r needs to be a power of 16. The cho-
sen value of number of samples was 164 = 65 536 as bigger powers of 16 resulted
in intervals of r that have significant spikes in plots of their λ. The plot of λ es-
timated for the resulting interval of r ∈ 〈4 − 65 536 · 10−15, 4 − 10−15〉, x0 = 0.5
and n = 1 000 is shown in Figure 10. While the analysis was done with resolu-
tion equivalent to 4 · 1016 samples for interval 〈0, 4〉, the plot uses coarser resolution


































































































Figure 10. Lyapunov exponents for chosen interval of values for parameter r
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The reason behind the choice of x0 being fixed at 0.5 is the rather small effect
on the resulting iterate values xn. Its impact is present mostly in areas with smaller
or negative λ as it was explained in Section 2.2 and especially in Figure 7.
As 4 hexadecimal characters are mapped to 65 536 very similar values of r, the
impact of a slightly different key on the resulting iterate values xn might raise some
concern. As it was pointed out in Section 2.1, the LM uses a concept of the transient
period. In the case of our proposal, its length is set to 100 iterates for each used
value of r. As our solution alternates between r and its complement rc, the total
length of the transient period for each used r is 200 iterates. The resulting values
of x200 obtained by similar values of r are displayed in Table 3.
rc = r − 10−5
used r 4− 32 768 · 10−15 4− 32 767 · 10−15 4− 32 766 · 10−15
x0 0.5 0.5 0.5
x1 0.999999999991808 0.999999999991808 0.999999999991809
x2 0.000000000032768 0.000000000032767 0.000000000032766
x3 0.000000000131072 0.000000000131068 0.000000000131063
x4 0.000000000524286 0.000000000524271 0.000000000524250
. . . . . . . . . . . .
x200 0.845629440355832 0.933763238939059 0.189452959055630
Table 3. Different values of x200 obtained with similar values of r
The results presented in Table 3 show that even small differences in value of r
result in rather big differences in values of x200. This is a property of chaos, known
as a butterfly effect [31].
Image encryption algorithms usually utilize multiple PR sequences for their op-
erations. Therefore, multiple values of r are necessary which brings up the key length
to multiples of 4 hexadecimal characters or 16 bits. However, current encryption
algorithms utilize key lengths that exceed even 256 bits. In order to enable usage of
longer keys (and thus larger key space), our proposal uses multiple values of r and
their respective rc during the transient period. These are denoted as ri and rc,i and
their amount depends on desired size of the key space.
The example of multiple ri and rc,i used in an image encryption algorithm is
illustrated in Table 4. In this case, the algorithm uses 8 values of ri and their
respective rc,i in order to produce 4 final PR sequences. The rule which determines
purpose of individual key parts is also known as a key schedule.
This example uses 8 values of ri and their respective rc,i. As each ri is computed
from 16 bits of key, the total length of a key for the example is 8 · 16 = 128 bits.
As all of the ri and rc,i are used during the transient period, even a small change
in one part of the key affects all generated PR sequences. This concept is known as
key diffusion [35, 36]. Total size of the transient period in this case is 1 600 iterates
(100 for each of the ri and rc,i).
1264 J. Oravec, Ľ. Ovseńık, J. Turán, T. Huszańık
sequence
indexes i of ri and rc,i used indexes i of ri and rc,i used
during the transient period after the transient period
seq1 1 to 8 1
seq2 2 to 8, then 1 2
seq3 3 to 8, then 1 and 2 3
seq4 4 to 8, then 1 to 3 4
Table 4. An example of a simple key schedule
3.2 Suppression of Periodic Cycles and Fixed Points
As it was mentioned earlier in Section 2.3, the occurrence of periodic cycles could
be greatly suppressed by usage of values of r that have positive λ. Analysis of the
periodic cycles is quite computationally exhaustive and has been performed only for
the single precision data type yet [10]. On the other hand, the values of fixed points
could be easily derived for each value of r as it was already shown.
In order to suppress these drawbacks, our proposal alternates between two re-
lated parameter values r and rc. Each odd iteration of the LM uses r, while each
even iteration utilizes respective rc. This approach should be able to solve both
mentioned problems.
Because the rules proposed in our approach should have minimal impact on the
computational complexity of whole image encryption algorithms, it is important to
have a fast way for computing rc from r. As the chosen interval for value of r is
〈4−65 536·10−15, 4−10−15〉, we decided to select interval for rc as 〈4−10−5−65 536·
10−15, 4− 10−5− 10−15〉. This interval of rc should provide several advantages: first
of all the chosen rc should have favorable values of λ as they are still close to r = 4.
The plot of values of λ for the mentioned interval of rc with x0 = 0.5, n = 1 000 and
resolution equivalent to 4 · 1013 samples for interval 〈0, 4〉 is shown in Figure 11.
Secondly, the selection of interval for rc leads to a simple formula for its calcu-
lation from r (5):
rc = r − 10−5. (5)
Lastly, as the values of rc and r are different on their fifth decimal place, a slightly
adapted quantization block presented in our previous work [24] should be able to
ensure quick divergence from any fixed points. An example of fixed points for one
pair of parameters r and rc is shown in Table 5.
parameter r rc
value 4− 10−15 4− 10−5 − 10−15
fixed point at 1− 1r 0.75 0.749999374998438
Table 5. Fixed points for a pair of parameters r and rc
While the difference between fixed points displayed in Table 5 may seem neg-
ligible, it is big enough to ensure quick divergence from fixed points with usage of































































































Figure 11. Lyapunov exponents for chosen interval of values for parameter rc
suitable quantization approach. If value of rc would be obtained by modification of
a higher decimal place, the plot of resulting λ could contain significant spikes and
it could also negatively affect the distribution of iterate values after their quantiza-
tion.
3.3 Quantization and Successive Iterate Relation
In our previous work, it was found out that the non-uniform distribution of iterate
values xn is caused mainly by higher amount of iterate values that are close to the
boundaries of interval (0, 1) [24, 35]. This could be easily fixed by dismissing several
decimal places of iterate values after whole sequence of iterates has been computed.
A quantization technique that dismisses first four decimal places of each iterate
value xn was proposed in [35]. Its equation could be expressed as (6):
x′n =
⌊
(maxval + 1) ·
(
104 · xn (mod 1)
)⌋
(6)
where x′n is a sequence of quantized iterate values, brackets bac denote the greatest
integer less than or equal to a, n is a sequential number of an iterate and maxval is
maximal allowed value after quantization.
The effects of quantization by (6) are shown in Figures 12 and 13. The sequences
for these plots were made in the same way as for Figures 8 and 9. Figure 13 uses
only one value of r = 4−10−15 so please compare it only with red bars from Figure 9.
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Figure 13. Distribution of iterate values after quantization
Please note that the quantization by using (6) suppresses relations between
successive iterates. While the relations can be found in a sequence of computed
iterates, the removal of the first four decimal places by quantization results in a more
uniform distribution of the points shown by a Poincaré plot in Figure 12. Also, the
amount of points on the horizontal lines belonging to x′n is not clear so any attempts
to obtain x′n−1 from x
′
n are even harder.
The histogram of values of quantized iterates displayed in Figure 13 shows that
the distribution is much more uniform than in the previous case (see red bars on
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Figure 9). Removal of more decimal places did not yield better results in terms of
more uniform distribution of iterate values [35, 24].
As it was mentioned, the quantization technique greatly affects the speed of
divergence from fixed points. An example is presented in Table 6. Please note
that the same values of x0 and r were used in Table 2. However the previous case
did not alternate between r and rc and therefore ended in an occurrence of a fixed
point.
r = 4− 10−15, fixed point at xn = 0.75
rc = 4− 10−5 − 10−15, fixed point at xn = 0.749999374998438
iterate value
value after removal value after quantization
of first four decimal places by (6), maxval = 255
x0 0.75 – –
x1 0.75 0.999999999998181 255
x2 0.749998125000000 0.981250000002547 251
x3 0.750003749985937 0.037499859367927 9
x4 0.749990624990627 0.906249906268386 231
x5 0.750018749667183 0.187496671829649 47
x6 0.749960624353186 0.606243531856308 155
x7 0.750078745091862 0.787450918623108 201
. . . . . . . . . . . .
x50 0.202236261140394 0.362611403942537 92
x51 0.645347023281394 0.470232813938310 120
x52 0.915494682550523 0.946825505234301 242
x53 0.309456675088959 0.566750889588548 145
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 6. An illustration of quick divergence from fixed point
Values reported in Table 6 show that the first usage of rc which has a different
fixed point introduces a slight divergence from the fixed point for r. Also, if the
value of computed iterate would be equal to the fixed point for rc, the alternation
to r would help to provide a small perturbation which would result in a diver-
gence.
There are two interesting facts about values presented in Table 6. Firstly, the
value of x1 = 0.75 after removal of the first 4 decimal places becomes ∼ 0.99999.
This is due to fact that x1 is represented by its closest possible representation in
double precision data type which is actually 0.74999999999999978. The first four
decimal places of this number are removed and the other places are shifted towards
the decimal point. The last two decimal places (78) are changed in order to meet
the closest possible number after the quantization in double precision data type
(8181).
The second interesting fact is that the values of x1, x2 and x3 are close to the
boundaries of set {0, 1, . . . , 255}. However, after rather small amount of iterates,
the distribution becomes more uniform.
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4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Usage of the proposed rules should result in a more suitable behavior of the LM (1)
and therefore it can positively affect the performance of whole image encryption
algorithms. On the other hand more complex computations can raise computational
complexity. In order to investigate these assumptions, the proposed set of rules was
applied to one of our prior image encryption algorithms published in [24]. The
mentioned algorithm was already highly optimized for achieving good performance,
so the resulting values of numerical parameters should clearly show the effect of the
proposed set of rules.
All performed measurements were done on a PC with 2.5 GHz CPU, 12 GBs of
RAM in computing environment MATLAB R2015a on Windows 10 OS. A set of
experimental plain images lena, lenaG and peppersG is shown in Figure 14. Their
parameters are described in Table 7. A set of experimental keys K1 and K2 are
presented in Table 8. The first one was derived from binary representation of decimal
part of number π. The second key has a minimal difference, as the sixth hexadecimal
character is changed from 0 to 1.
lena lenaG peppersG
Figure 14. A set of experimental plain images
image lena lenaG peppersG
height [px] 512 512 512
width [px] 512 512 512
color depth [bits/px] 24 8 8
Table 7. Parameters of used plain images
key value
K1 0× C4 EB 50 BC 0E C5 EB 50 BC 0E C5 EB 50 BC 0E C5
K2 0× C4 EB 51 BC 0E C5 EB 50 BC 0E C5 EB 50 BC 0E C5
Table 8. A set of experimental keys
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4.1 Brief Description of Used Algorithm
The image encryption algorithm proposed in [24] processes images with arbitrary
resolution higher than 16×16 pixels. This restriction is caused by Mojette transform
(MoT) that is used during a plaintext related chaining stage. The color depths of
input images could be either 8 or 24 bits per pixel. Used key is 128 bits long, entered
in a hexadecimal form and it is used for generation of six PR sequences by means
of the LM (1).
Described image encryption algorithm has 5 stages. The first and the last stage
combine image pixel intensities with PR sequences generated by the LM (1). Since
these combinations protect the other stages against attacks, the security of whole
examined image encryption algorithm relies heavily on the first and last stage.
The second stage rearranges image pixels in order to suppress correlation be-
tween adjacent image pixel intensities. The rearrangement is carried out by cyclic
shifts in individual columns of the processed image followed by cyclic shifts in the
rows of the image.
Stages three and four introduce dependencies between pixel intensities in order
to increase sensitivity to small differences between various plain images. While the
third stage scans and processes the image in all four possible directions for spreading
the differences, the fourth stage uses pixel intensities as parameters for the MoT.
The previously loaded pixel intensities choose values that are combined with actually
processed pixel intensities.
The decryption algorithm utilizes analogous stages in a reversed order. More
details about this solution could be found in [24].
4.2 Modifications of Used Algorithm
Due to previous optimization of the used algorithm a rather small amount of mod-
ifications was necessary for adhering to the proposed set of rules. First of all,
the concept of shifting between values of r and rc was introduced. The inter-
vals for these parameters were set as it was recommended in Section 3.1: r ∈
〈4− 65 536 · 10−15, 4− 10−15〉 and rc ∈ 〈4− 10−5 − 65 536 · 10−15, 4− 10−5 − 10−15〉.
Secondly, the whole key schedule was reworked as the original approach used
parts of the key with 8 hexadecimal characters. This was not longer possible as the
65 536 possible values of r or rc are represented only by 4 hexadecimal characters.
The eight values of r and their respective values of rc are computed by (7):
ri = 4 + 10
−15 · (Ki − 65 536),
rc,i = ri − 10−5
(7)
where Ki represents a decimal form of i
th four hexadecimal character group from
key K, i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , 8. The conversion from a hexadecimal to a decimal form uses
big endian ordering scheme.
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The key schedule used in the modified algorithm is presented in Table 9. Each
parameter is used for 100 iterations in the transient period (each pair of r ad rc
therefore for 200 iterations). The total amount of iterations during the transient
period is extended from previously used 1 000 iterates to 1 600.
sequence
indexes i of ri and rc,i used indexes i of ri and rc,i used
during the transient period after the transient period
seq1 1 to 8 1
seq2 2 to 8, then 1 2
seq3 3 to 8, then 1 and 2 3
seq4 4 to 8, then 1 to 3 4
seq5 5 to 8, then 1 to 4 5
seq6 6 to 8, then 1 to 5 6
Table 9. Key schedule used in the modified algorithm
Finally, the quantization does not shift decimal places of iterates by five places
anymore. In order to provide both quick divergence from fixed points and suppres-
sion of relations between successive iterations, the quantization shifts decimal places
by four places by (6) and rc is set in a way that it is different from r on fifth decimal
place. These steps were selected because of suitable values of λ for r and rc with x0
fixed at 0.5. More details on this issue were presented in Section 2.2.
A simple verification that the proposed set of rules did not significantly harm the
basic features of the original image encryption algorithm can be performed through
encryption and decryption an image. The example presented in Figure 15 used plain
image lena and key K1. The first decryption used correct key and its result is the
same as the plain image. However second decryption deliberately used a wrong key








Figure 15. Preserved key sensitivity of the modified algorithm
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4.3 Used Numerical Parameters
There are several commonly utilized numerical parameters that can be used for mea-
suring performance of the image encryption algorithms. This paper utilizes values
of correlation coefficients ρ, entropy H, Number of Pixel Change Ratio (NPCR)
and Unified Average Changing Intensity (UACI). The last two parameters were
described by Wu et al. in [37].
In addition to these parameters, this paper also utilizes a measure of compu-
tational complexity known as number of cycles necessary for an operation (either
encryption or decryption of an image). This measure takes into account resolution
and color depth of the testing images and also a configuration of used PC.
Values of correlation coefficients ρ are computed separately for each color plane
in three directions – horizontally (denoted as ρh), vertically (ρv) and diagonally (ρd).
The computation of ρ is usually done on a finite amount of randomly chosen pixel
pairs. Each pixel pair contains intensities of two image pixels that are adjacent in
a chosen direction. In general, ρ are computed by using (8):
ρ =
∑numpp







where pp = 1, 2, . . . , numpp is an index of pixel pair, numpp is total amount of pixel
pairs (usually selected as 1 000), vectors vec1 and vec2 represent intensities of pixels
from pixel pairs and vec denotes arithmetic mean of vector vec.
The entropy H as it was described by Shannon [38] can be viewed as a random-
ness measure of a information source. It is computed individually for each color




p(in) · log2 (p(in)) [bits/px] (9)
where L is a color depth of investigated color plane, in denotes intensity of image
pixel and p(in) stands for a probability of occurrence of pixel with intensity in. The
ideal value of entropy H is close to the color depth of investigated color plane.
Each computation of NPCR and UACI utilizes two encrypted images E1 and
E2. These were made by encryption with the same algorithm and the same key from
plain images P1 and P2. The first plain image P1 was arbitrarily chosen, while the
second plain image P2 is a copy of P1 with a difference in an intensity of one image
pixel. Furthermore, the size of this difference is minimal (only one intensity level).
Values of NPCR and UACI therefore measure the differences done by encryption of
two almost identical plain images.
The location of the difference introduced in plain image P2 is usually randomly
chosen. In order to suppress the impact of certain locations on the resulting values,
the values of NPCR and UACI are presented as a mean of larger set of measurements
(usually mean of 100 computed values).
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Number of Pixel Change Ratio (NPCR) is calculated individually for each color








Diffmat(l, k) [%] (10)
where h and w represent height and width of images E1 and E2, l and k are line and
column indexes and Diffmat is a difference matrix, Diffmat(l, k) = 1 if E1(l, k) 6=
E2(l, k), Diffmat(l, k) = 0 otherwise.
Unified Average Changing Intensity (UACI) is also computed individually for








|E1(l, k)− E2(l, k)|
2L − 1
[%] (11)
where brackets |a| denote absolute value of a and L is a color depth of the investi-
gated color plane.
Please note that while NPCR only sums amount of pixels with different in-
tensities after encryption of P1 and P2, UACI also takes into account the size of
individual differences. Also, the proposal of NPCR and UACI by Wu et al. [37]
mentions expected values of the two parameters. The expected values are presented
as intervals and they depend on a resolution of used images. If a computed value
of NPCR or UACI belongs to the interval of the expected value, the resulting en-
crypted image can be considered as robust against differential attacks with certain
confidence (determined by significance level α) [37].
For one of the most used significance levels at α = 0.001 which results in confi-
dence of 99.9 %, the intervals of NPCR and UACI for an image with resolution of
512× 512 pixels are (99.5717 %, 100 %〉 and (33.1594 %, 33.7677 %), respectively.
The computational complexity of the image encryption algorithms can be mea-
sured via time toper necessary for completing an operation (encryption or decryption)
on an image. Usually, a mean of 100 repeated measurements is used for suppressing
effect of some faster or slower times (e.g. due to other processes running on a testing
PC). These means are denoted as tenc for encryption times and tdec for decryption
times in the following text.
Configuration of the testing PC is taken into account by computing number of
CPU cycles that are necessary for an operation with one byte of image data. The
equation for this measure is given as (12):
cycoper =
fCPU · toper · 23
h · w · d
[cycles/B] (12)
where fCPU is a clock frequency of CPU in the testing PC, toper is the operation
(encryption or decryption) time in seconds, h and w stand for height and width
of the used image, d is its color depth given in bits per pixel and a constant of
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23 represents amount of bits in a byte. Please note that most image encryption
algorithms utilize computational environments that use only one CPU core.
4.4 Measured Values and Discussion
The measured values of correlation coefficients ρ, entropy H, NPCR and UACI for
plain images lena, lenaG and peppersG encrypted by keys K1 and K2 are included
in Table 10. Please bear in mind, that this comparison is done only for investigat-
ing impact of the proposed set of rules, therefore the values for plain images (not
encrypted) are not presented. The letters R, G and B stand for red, green and blue
color plane. Symbol ‘–’ denotes that the presented results are obtained for the only
color plane of grayscale images.
image and
key
ρh ρv ρd H NPCR UACI
color plane [–] [–] [–] [bits/px] [%] [%]




0.0004 0.0013 0.0005 7.9993 99.6101 33.4738
G −0.001 −0.0021 −0.0037 7.9994 99.6109 33.4742
B −0.0032 −0.002 0.0017 7.9992 99.6103 33.4746
R
K2
0.0033 0.0026 −0.001 7.9994 99.6105 33.4742
G 0.0006 0.0015 −0.0016 7.9993 99.6113 33.4749
B 0.0016 0.0013 0.003 7.9993 99.6101 33.4743
lenaG –
K1 0.0008 0.0005 −0.0004 7.9992 99.61 33.4714
K2 0.0015 0.001 −0.0012 7.9993 99.6099 33.4725
peppersG –
K1 0.0051 0.0007 −0.0001 7.9991 99.6106 33.4721
K2 0.0019 −0.0011 −0.0008 7.9991 99.6121 33.4729




0.0019 0.0015 0.0019 7.9993 99.6191 33.4908
G −0.0005 0.0021 0.0034 7.9993 99.6204 33.49
B −0.0018 0.0005 −0.0004 7.9993 99.6183 33.4873
R
K2
−0.0001 −0.001 −0.0006 7.9992 99.6202 33.4884
G 0.0009 −0.0001 −0.0038 7.9993 99.6198 33.4894
B 0.0001 0.0007 −0.0017 7.9992 99.621 33.4872
lenaG –
K1 0.0021 0.0006 0.0019 7.9992 99.6206 33.4867
K2 −0.0032 0.0013 0.0002 7.9993 99.6196 33.4904
peppersG –
K1 0.0003 −0.0001 −0.0008 7.9994 99.6187 33.4856
K2 −0.0001 −0.0034 0.0027 7.9993 99.618 33.4892
Table 10. Measured values of ρ, H, NPCR and UACI
The results presented in Table 10 show that difference in values of correlation
coefficients ρ (computed from 1000 pairs of adjacent pixel intensities) did not change
much by application of the proposed set of rules. Also, the change in values of en-
tropy H might be viewed as negligible. This could be caused by a good performance
of the original algorithm as it was discussed in the paper [24].
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On the other hand, the values of NPCR and UACI were slightly improved.
Please bear in mind, that there is only a slight improvement, but it could greatly
help in the case of a differential attack. Also, since the proposed set of rules mitigates
vulnerabilities of the LM, the possibility of other attacks should be suppressed. On
top of that, all values of NPCR and UACI for both the original algorithm and its
improved version belong to intervals of the expected values [37].
The increase of computational complexity is illustrated by values included in Ta-
ble 11. It is clearly seen that application of the proposed set of rules has only a small
impact on computational complexity of the whole image encryption algorithm. Fur-
thermore, the used algorithm was highly optimized so any new modifications could
result in a visible increase of computational complexity.
image key
tenc increase tdec increase cycenc cycdec
[ms] [%] [ms] [%] [cycles/B] [cycles/B]





1 386.72 1 336.94





1 204.01 1 170.35





1 212.62 1 171.19
K2 126.8485 122.7695 1 209.72 1 170.82
algorithm from [24] improved by the proposed solution
lena
K1 448.7342 2.87 429.9181 2.22 1 426.49 1 366.67
K2 447.9295 2.65 431.0329 2.53 1 423.93 1 370.22
lenaG
K1 129.5253 2.59 126.5223 3.1 1 235.25 1 206.61
K2 130.9827 3.18 125.8389 2.61 1 249.15 1 200.09
peppersG
K1 130.8076 2.87 125.5048 2.2 1 247.48 1 196.91
K2 129.9531 2.45 125.7442 2.42 1 239.33 1 199.19
Table 11. Measured values of computational complexity
The measured increase of the computational complexity was ranging approxi-
mately from 2.2 % to 3.2 % (with the worst case of almost 13 ms for a true color
image with a resolution of 512 × 512 pixels). This is a relatively interesting result
for as complex changes as those described in Section 4.2. This finding can also im-
ply that well-tailored fixes or bigger patches could further improve the behavior of
simpler chaotic maps like the LM.
4.5 Comparison with Some Other Proposals
The impact of the proposed set of rules on the LM could be pointed out by a com-
parison of numerical results with some other approaches. Some of the relatively new
algorithms were selected for the comparison, with a strong emphasis on algorithms
that use multidimensional systems. Usage of these systems in image encryption is
interesting as some researchers directly relate the robustness of whole image encryp-
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tion algorithm to behavior of its chaotic system given by its LEs. However, the
finite precision and some bad implementations can degrade their results. Therefore,
we would like to compare results obtained by our well-tuned algorithm based on
a simple chaotic map with the numerical results and computational complexity of
image encryption algorithms that utilize far more complex chaotic systems.
An approach using a cascade of two chaotic maps was described by Cao et al.
in 2018 [25]. The authors discuss that in certain interval, the parameter of used
chaotic system results in λ close to value of 6. A similar solution was proposed by
Alawida et al. in 2019 [26], where resulting value of λ is close to 2. Moreover, these
researchers performed a brief investigation regarding relation of successive iterates.
A paper by Sun et al. [28] from 2019 describes an algorithm that uses seven
dimensional chaotic system. Also, the computational complexity of this algorithm
is increased by usage of hash function for introducing a plaintext related operation.
Liu et al. published a paper [39] in 2020 that characterizes their algorithm as
“fast”. However they still use the combination of two relatively complex chaotic
maps that negatively affect the resulting computational complexity.
The comparison of numerical results including the computational complexity
given in amount of cycles necessary for an encryption of one byte of image data
cycenc is shown in Table 12. The value in italics marks that it was the best among
all compared approaches and value ‘–’ stands for not reported measurement.
approach
ρh ρv ρd H NPCR UACI cycenc
[–] [–] [–] [bits/px] [%] [%] [cycles/B]
plain image lenaG
proposed 0.0021 0.0006 0.0019 7.9992 99.6206 33.4867 1 235.25
ref. [25] 0.0019 0.0012 0.0009 7.9973 99.6096 33.4574 9 402.59
ref. [26] −0.0017 −0.0084 −0.0019 7.9975 99.62 33.505 24 644.78
ref. [39] 0.0106 −0.0012 0.0009 – 99.6216 33.4994 3 484.18
plain image peppersG
proposed 0.0003 −0.0001 −0.0008 7.9994 99.6187 33.4856 1 247.48
ref. [26] 0.0024 −0.0131 0.0002 7.997 99.617 33.391 –
ref. [28] 0.0017 0.0012 −0.0128 7.9978 99.62 33.63 27 694.7
Table 12. A comparison of the obtained numerical results
Obtained values of correlation coefficients ρ show just little differences between
compared approaches. On the other hand, the results for entropy H are much more
different. It could be noticed that the proposed solution achieves the best values
of H, very close to the theoretical boundary of 8 bits per pixel.
Probably the most interesting values for comparison are those of NPCR and
UACI. While [25] has quite low values of both NPCR and UACI, the other three
algorithms that used plain image lenaG have similar values of NPCR. The solu-
tion described in this paper obtains the lowest value of UACI among these three
approaches even after the value was increased by applying the proposed set of rules.
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Results for encryption algorithms that utilized plain image peppersG show an ex-
ample of an unbalanced performance. While the value of NPCR obtained by [26] is
quite high, the value of UACI is the lowest among all reported values. Even more in-
teresting is a fact that the same algorithm achieved best value of UACI for previous
plain image lenaG. The solution proposed in this paper may have far worse value of
UACI than [28], however its performance is uniform over both plain images used for
a comparison. Values of UACI reported in [28] for other plain images (lenaG was
not used) varied from 33.36 % to 33.63 %.
The measurement of amount of CPU cycles necessary for encryption of one
byte of image data shows that our proposal is clearly the fastest one among the
discussed algorithms. A rather interesting contrast is shown by values of cycenc for
quite similar approaches [25] and [26]. The first design was much more optimized
as it used more than 2.5 times less CPU cycles to complete the encryption than
the second approach. Also, the second fastest solution from [39] took almost three
times more CPU cycles than the proposed solution. The slowest algorithm [28] is
negatively affected mainly by high complexity of used operations.
5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper described and extensively analyzed some of the vulnerabilities related to
the usage of logistic map in image encryption algorithms. Some of the drawbacks
were identified and suppressed already in the past, however, some others are present
also in the newer proposals. This paper namely dealt with the usage of parameter
values that result in a predictable behavior of the map, its periodic cycles and fixed
points.
These disadvantages are mitigated by a proposed set of rules. One of the rules
describes a way to choose a pair of suitable parameter values. Usage of appropriate
parameter values in a data type with finite precision should prevent occurrence of
periodic cycles. Also the speed of divergence from a fixed point was investigated.
A rather quick divergence was reached by a combination of alternating parameter
values and a modified quantization technique.
In order to verify the mentioned assumptions, the proposed set of rules was ap-
plied on an algorithm from our prior work. Obtained numerical results show that
the usage of the rules helped to enhance the chaotic behavior of a rather simple
logistic map to the level that the image encryption algorithm based on it achieves
almost the same values of numerical parameters as algorithms based on more com-
plex chaotic systems. Moreover, the logistic map still preserves its advantages such
as a relatively simple usage leading to lower computational complexity. Also, as the
properties of the logistic map are quite well studied, the probability of finding some
new vulnerabilities is smaller than in newer, more complex chaotic systems.
Because the usage of the proposed set of rules did not significantly increase
the computational complexity (the results show an increase ranging approx. from
2.2 % to 3.2 %), it gives a possibility for even more work in this area. However, it
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needs to be done with great care, as there are many examples of image encryption
algorithms that have a higher computational complexity, as they rely on computa-
tionally exhaustive techniques such as cascades of chaotic maps, their coupling or
hash functions.
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University of Košice in 2017. Currently, he is Ph.D. student in
the same department. His research interests include all opti-
cal networks and degradation mechanisms in all optical WDM
systems.
